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11. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing
certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium)
level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini co-
efficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of
polarization due to Esteban and Ray.
Income inequality has been always viewed as closely related to conflict. In the Introduc-
tion of his celebrated book “On Income Inequality” Sen (1972) asserts that “the relation
between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one”. Early empirical studies on the
role of inequality in explaining civil conflict have focussed on the personal distribution
of income or of landownership.2
Contemporary literature has shifted the emphasis from class to ethnic conflict. Here too
the initial presumption has been that ethnic diversity is a key factor for ethnic conflict.
Easterly and Levine (1997) used the index of fractionalization as a measure of diversity,
and the measure has been used in several different empirical studies of conflict (see, e.g.,
Collier and Hoffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti
(2004). More recently, following on the idea that highly fragmented societies may not
be highly conflictual,3 measures of polarization have also made their way into empirical
studies of conflict.4
These contributions, while loosely based on theoretical arguments, are essentially em-
pirically motivated in an attempt to identify a statistical regularity. The preference for
one particular index or another simply depends on its ability to fit the facts. In contrast,
there is to our knowledge no behavioral model explaining why should we expect —
to begin with — a relationship between the Gini or the fractionalization indices, and
conflict.5
In this paper we present a behavioral model of conflict that precisely defines the links
between conflict and measures of dispersion, such as inequality and polarization. The
model is general, in that it allows for conflict over both divisible private goods and
2See, for instance, Nagel (1974), Muller and Seligson (1987), Brockett (1992) or the survey article by
Lichbach (1989).
3For instance, Horowitz (1985) argues that large cleavages are more germane to the study of conflict,
stating that “a centrally focused system [with few groupings] possesses fewer cleavages than a dispersed
system, but those it possesses run through the whole society and are of greater magnitude. When conflict
occurs, the center has little latitude to placate some groups without antagonizing others.”
4See Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson (1994) for the earliest development of polarization measures,
and Reynal-Querol (2002) for a special case of the Esteban-Ray measure which is then applied to a cross-
section study of ethnic conflict by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). See also the special issue of the
Journal of Peace Research edited by Esteban and Schneider (2008) entirely devoted to the links between
polarization and conflict.
5Esteban and Ray (1999) do discuss the possible links between polarization and equilibrium conflict in
a model of strategic behavior. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) also derive a measure of polarization
from a rent-seeking game.
2(group-based) public goods.6 It is also general in that it allows for varying degrees
of within-group cohesion, running the gamut from individualistic decisions (as in the
voluntary contributions model) all the way to choices imposed by benevolent group
leaders. Our main result is that equilibrium conflict can be approximated as a weighted
average of a particular inequality measure (the Gini coefficient), the fractionalization
index used by Easterly and Levine and others, and a particular polarization measure
from the class axiomatized by Esteban and Ray (1994). Moreover, the weights depend
in a precise way on two parameters: the “degree of publicness” of the prize and the
extent of intra-group “cohesion”. In particular, our result suggests that if our derived
equation were to be taken to the data, the estimated coefficients would be informative
regarding these parameters.
While we link the severity of conflict to these measures, our paper does not address the
issue of conflict onset. As discussed in Esteban and Ray (2008a), the knowledge of the
costs of open conflict may act as a deterrent. For this reason we argue there that the
relationship between conflict onset and the factors determining the intensity of conflict
may be non-linear. This issue is not addressed here: we assume that society is in a state
of conflict throughout.
We organize this paper as follows. Section 2 provides a very brief presentation of the ba-
sic measures of inequality and polarization. Section 3 develops a game-theoretic model
of conflict and some of its basic properties. The main result is obtained in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the accuracy of our approximation. Section 6 concludes.
2. INEQUALITY AND POLARIZATION
Suppose that population is distributed over m groups, with ni being the share of the
population belonging to group i. Denote by δij the “distance” between groups i and j
(more on this below). Fix the location of any given group i and compute the average
distance to the rest of locations. The Gini index G is the average of these distances as
we take each location in the support as a reference point.7 We write it in unnormalized
form8 as
(1) G =
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
ninjδij .
We haven’t been very specific about the distance δij . When groups are identified by
their income, this is simply the absolute value of the income difference between i and j.
However, in principle we could apply this index to distributions over political, ethnic
or religious groups. Unfortunately, in most cases where distance is non-monetary the
6The specific formulation is borrowed from Esteban and Ray (2001).
7The properties of the Gini index are well known. Its first axiomatization is due to Thon (1982).
8The Gini is typically renormalized by mean distance; this makes no difference to the current exposition.
3available information does not permit a reasonable estimate of δij . This is why it is
common to assume (sometimes implicitly) that δij = 1 for all i 6= j and, of course,
δii = 0. In that case, (1) reduces to
(2) F =
m∑
i=1
ni(1− ni)
This is the widely used Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index (Hirschman (1964)).
It captures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different
groups. As mentioned before, this measure has been used to link ethnolinguistic di-
versity to conflict, public goods provision, or growth.9 At the same time, we know of
no behavioral model of conflict that explicitly establishes a link between conflict and
inequality (or fractionalization).
Esteban and Ray (1994) introduce the notion of polarization as an appropriate indicator
for conflict.10 Their approach is founded on the postulate that group “identification”
(proxied by group size) and intergroup distances can both be conflictual. Duclos, Es-
teban and Ray (2004) work with density functions over a space of characteristics to
axiomatize a class of polarization measures, which we describe here for discrete distri-
butions:
(3) Pβ =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n1+βi njδij , for β ∈ [0.25, 1]
An additional axiom, introduced and discussed by Esteban and Ray (1994), pins down
the value of β at 1:
(4) P ≡ P1 =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n2injδij .
Because (4) is not derived formally for the model studied in Duclos, Esteban and Ray
(2004), we provide a self-contained treatment in the Appendix.
9See also Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Ellingsen (2000), Hegre et al.
(2001), Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) among others.
10Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994, 1997) proposed an alternative measure of polarization
specifically designed to capture the “disapearence of the middle class”. Later, alternative measures of
polarization have been proposed by Wang and Tsui (2000), Chakravarty and Majumder (2001), Zhang and
Kanbur (2001), Reynal-Querol (2002), Rodrı´guez and Salas (2002), and Esteban, Gradı´n and Ray (2007).
4The formal properties of this measure are discussed in detail in Esteban and Ray (1994).11
It suffices here to focus on the squared term, which imputes a large weight to group
identification. This weighting of group size implies that P does not satisfy Dalton’s
Transfer Principle (or equivalently, compatibility with second-order stochastic domi-
nance of distance distributions). In this fundamental aspect it behaves differently from
Lorenz-consistent inequality measures. In particular, P attains its maximum at a sym-
metric bimodal distribution.
As in the case of fractionalization, a situation of particular relevance is one in which
group distances are binary: δij = 1 for all j 6= i and δii = 0. In this case P reduces to
(5) P˜ =
m∑
i=1
n2i (1− ni),
This is the measure of polarization proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002).
3. A MODEL OF CONFLICT
We wish to explore the relationship between the measures described in the previous
section and the equilibrium level of conflict attained in a behavioral model in which
agents optimally choose the amount of resources to expend in conflict.12
3.1. Public and Private Goods. Consider a society composed of individuals situated
in m groups. Let Ni be the number of individuals in group i, and N the total number
of individuals, so that
∑m
i=1Ni = N . These groups are assumed to contest a budget
with per capita value normalized to unity. We shall suppose that a fraction λ of this
budget is available to produce society-wide public goods. One of the groups will get to
control the mix of public goods (as described below), but it is assumed that λ is given.
The remaining fraction, 1 − λ, can be privately divided, and once again the “winning”
group can seize these resources.13
All individuals derive identical linear payoff from their consumption of the private
good, but differ in their preference over the public goods available. All the members
11Although in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) groups are identified by
their income — and hence δij is the income distance between the two groups — the notion and measure of
polarization can be naturally adapted to the case of “social polarization”. Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004)
consider the case of “pure social polarization”, in which income plays no role in group identity or inter-
group alienation. For that case they propose (4) as the appropriate polarization measure (pp. 1759) with
δij interpreted as the alienation felt by an individual of group i with respect to a member of group j.
12We build on the model of conflict in Esteban and Ray (1999).
13This description may correspond to a conflict for the control of the government. Once in government
the group may decide to change the types of public goods provided and the beneficiaries of the various
forms of transfers in the budget. But it is not possible to substantially modify the structure of the budget.
5of a group share the same preferences. Each group has a mix of public goods they pre-
fer most. Using the private good as numeraire, define uij to be public goods payoff to a
member of group i if a single unit per-capita of the optimal mix for group j is produced.
We may then write the per capita payoff to group i as λuii+(1−λ)(N/Ni) (in case i wins
the conflict) and λuij (in case some other group j wins).14
The parameter λ can also be interpreted as an indicator of the importance of the public
good payoff relative to the “monetary” payoff used as numeraire.
We presume throughout that uii > uij for all i, j with i 6= j.
3.2. Conflict Resources and Outcomes. We view conflict as a situation in which there is
no agreed-upon rule aggregating the alternative claims of different groups. The success
of each group is taken to be probabilistic, depending on the expenditure of “conflict
resources” by the members of each group. We now describe this conflict.
Let r denote the resources expended by a typical member of any group. We take such
expenditure to involve a isoelastic cost of
(6) c(r) =
1
θ
rθ,
where we assume that θ ≥ 2 (more on this below). Denote by ri(k) the contribution of
resources by member k of group i, and define Ri ≡
∑
k∈i ri(k). Our measure of societal
conflict is the total of all resources supplied by every individual:
(7) R =
m∑
i=1
Ri.
Let pj be the probability that group j wins the conflict. We suppose that
(8) pj =
Rj
R
for all j = 1, . . . ,m, provided thatR > 0.15 Thus the probability that group iwill win the
lottery is taken to be exactly equal to the share of total resources expended in support
of alternative i.
14Note that there is no exclusion in the provision of public goods. These are always provided to the
entire population; only the mix differs depending on which group has control. The implicit assumption
is that a scaling of the population requires a similar scaling of public goods output in order to generate
the same per-capita payoff. Because we hold the per-capita budget constant (and therefore change total
budget with population), this gives us exactly the specification in the main text.
15Assign some arbitrary vector of probabilities (summing to one) in case R = 0. There is, of course, no
way to complete the specification of the model at R = 0 while maintaining continuity of payoffs for all
groups. So the game thus defined must have discontinuous payoffs. This poses no problem for existence;
see Esteban and Ray (1999).
63.3. Payoffs and Extended Utility. We may therefore summarize the overall expected
payoff to an individual k in group i as
pii(k) =
m∑
j=1
pjλuij + pi
(1− λ)N
Ni
− 1
θ
ri(k)θ
=
m∑
j=1
pjλuij + pi
(1− λ)
ni
− 1
θ
ri(k)θ,(9)
where ni ≡ Ni/N is the population share of group i.
We now turn to a central issue: how are resources chosen? For reasons that will become
clear, we wish to allow for a flexible specification in which (at one end) individuals
choose r to maximize their own payoff, while (at the other end) there is full intra-group
cohesion and individual contributions are chosen to maximize group payoffs. We per-
mit these cases as well as a variety of situations in between by defining a group-i mem-
ber k’s extended utility to be
(10) Ui(k) ≡ (1− α)pii(k) + α
∑
`∈i
pii(`),
where α lies between 0 and 1. When α = 0, individual payoffs are maximized. When
α = 1, group payoffs are maximized.16 Note that k enters again in the summation term
in (10), so the weight on own payoffs is always 1.
One could interpret α as a measure of intragroup concern or altruism among the agents,
but this interpretation is not necessary. An equivalent (but somewhat looser) interpreta-
tion is that α is some measure of how within-group monitoring, coupled with promises
and threats, manage to overcome the free-rider problem of individual contributions. We
are comfortable with either interpretation, but formally take it that each individual acts
to maximize the expectation of extended utility, as defined in (10).
3.4. Equilibrium. The choice problem faced by a typical individual member k of group
i is easy to describe: given the vector of resources expended by all other groups and by
the rest of the members of the own group, choose ri(k) to maximize (10). This problem
is well-defined provided that at least one individual in at least one other group expends
a positive quantity of resources.
16This is similar to the description of intra-group altruism adopted in Sen (1964). For a more general
specification in the context of intergenerational altruism, see Barro and Becker (1989). It will not matter
whether extended utility is defined on other individual’s payoffs (the specification here), or their gross
expected payoff excluding resource cost, or indeed on others’ extended utility. (In this last case we would
need a contraction property for extended utility to be well-defined.) The results are insensitive to the exact
choice.
7Some obvious manipulation shows that the the maximization of (10) is equivalent to the
maximization of
[(1− α) + αNi]
pi 1− λ
ni
+ λ
m∑
j=1
pjuij
− 1
θ
ri(k)θ − α
∑
`∈i;` 6=k
1
θ
ri(`)θ
by the choice of ri(k). Simplify this expression by defining, for each i, σi ≡ (1−α)+αNi,
∆ii ≡ 0, and ∆ij ≡ λ[uii−uij ]+(1−λ)/ni for all j 6= i. Then our individual equivalently
chooses ri(k) to maximize
(11) −σi
m∑
j=1
pj∆ij − 1
θ
ri(k)θ.
Continuing to assume that rj(`) > 0 for some ` ∈ j 6= i, the solution to the choice of
ri(k) is completely described by the interior first-order condition:
(12)
σi
R
m∑
j=1
pj∆ij = ri(k)θ−1,
where we use (7) and (8).
An equilibrium is a collection {ri(k)} of individual contributions where for every group
i and member k, ri(k) maximizes (11), given all the other contributions.
PROPOSITION 1. An equilibrium always exists and it is unique. In an equilibrium, every
individual contribution satisfies the first-order condition (12). In particular, in every group,
members make the same contribution: ri(k) = ri(`) for every i and k, ` ∈ i.
Proof. First observe that in any equilibrium, Rj > 0 for some group j.17 But this means
that every member of every group other than j must satisfy (12). This proves that in
equilibrium, Ri > 0 for all i, and that for every group i and k ∈ i, (12) is satisfied. In
particular, we see that ri(k) = ri(`) for every i and k, ` ∈ i.
Call this common value ri. Multiply both sides of (12) by riNi and use (8) to see that
σi
m∑
j=1
pipj∆ij = Nirθi ,
and now define vij ≡ σi∆ij/Ni for all i to obtain the system
(13)
m∑
j=1
pipjvij = rθi
for all i. This is precisely the system described in Proposition 3.1 of Esteban and Ray
(1999), with s in place of p and c(r) ≡ (1/θ)rθ. Under the assumption that θ ≥ 2, the
17If this is false, then Ri = 0 for all i so that each group has a success probability given by the arbitrary
probability vector specified in footnote 15. For at least one group, say j, this probability must be strictly
less than one. But any member of j can raise this probability to 1 but contributing an infinitesimal quantity
of resources, a contradiction.
8proof of Proposition 3.2 applies entirely unchanged to show that the system (13) has a
unique solution.
When θ = 2, so that the cost function is quadratic, we can express the equilibrium of the
conflict game in particularly crisp form. For each i, the equilibrium condition (13) can
now be written as
m∑
j=1
pjvijn
2
i = piρ
2,
where ρ ≡ R/N is “per-capita conflict”. Denote by W the m × m matrix with n2i vij
as representative element. Then the equilibrium probability vector p and per-capita
conflict level ρ must together solve
Wp = ρ2p,
so that ρ2 is the unique positive eigenvalue of the matrix W and the equilibrium vector
of win probabilities p is the associated eigenvector on the m-dimensional unit simplex.
4. POLARIZATION, INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT
In this section, we establish our central result, one that links equilibrium conflict to a
linear combination of the distributional measures discussed earlier.
It will be useful to isolate the deviation of group win probabilities pi from group pop-
ulation share ni. Let γi stand for the ratio of these two objects: γi ≡ pi/ni. Note that
γi is not only an endogenous variable, it is (typically) unobservable as well. It refers to
the individual contribution ri, relative to the other rj ’s. If there were no differences in
individual behavior across groups, γi would equal 1 for all groups and win probabilities
would simply be equal to group population shares. For this reason, we shall refer to the
γi’s as “behavioral correction factors”.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that we make the approximation assumption that every behavioral
correction factor equals one. Then the per-capita cost of conflict is a linear function of the three
distributional measures F , G, and P :
(14) ρθ =
(
R
N
)θ
≈ ω1 + ω2G+ α[λP + (1− λ)F ],
where ω1 ≡ (1− λ)(1− α)(m− 1)/N and ω2 ≡ λ(1− α)/N . In particular, when population
is large, per-capita conflict is proportional to a convex combination of only P and F , provided
that group cohesion α > 0.
This stark result expresses equilibrium conflict in a behavioral model as a linear com-
bination of three familiar distributional indices; the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman fractionalization index, and the Esteban-Ray polarization measure with co-
efficient β = 1 (see (4)). Moreover, the weights on the combination tell us when each
measure is likely to be a more important covariate of conflict. Specifically, the weights
associated to each of these three indices depend on the degree of publicness of the prize,
9as proxied by λ, and on the level of intra-group cohesion, as proxied by α. They also
depend on overall population.
In particular, as population grows large, the weight on the “intercept term” as well as
the Gini coefficient converges to zero. Conflict becomes roughly proportional to pop-
ulation, and the ratio of the two only depends on polarization and fractionalization,
provided group cohesion α is positive. This last restriction is easy to understand. If
α = 0, then free-rider considerations become dominant, and conflict per capita dwindles
to zero for large populations.
The merit of a decomposition such as (14) depends on whether it yields a deeper and
more intuitive understanding of the factors influencing conflict beyond the abstractions
of a specific model. We would claim that our decomposition does accomplish this to
some degree. It seems reasonable to classify the main forces driving conflict into three
categories: group size, what the group is fighting for and the degree of overall cohe-
sion of (or commitment to) the cause of the group. What groups are fighting for will
determine how alienated groups will feel from each other. How cohesive a group is
will determine the extent of within-group identification. These are precisely the two
ingredients emphasized in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Ray and Esteban (2004)
as the main determinants of conflict.
Suppose that we observe a situation of conflict in which all groups fight for the control
of an excludable private good (such as the revenue from valuable natural resources).
Then the only feature distinguishing the different groups is their size. There is no “pri-
mordial” inter-group alienation relevant to this conflict. In that case we should expect
that the distribution of group sizes will be the most relevant explanatory factor for con-
flict. Any measure designed to capture inter-group “distances” should have little to say
here. Indeed, the decomposition above with full privateness — λ = 0 — leaves group
fractionalization as the sole relevant indicator for conflict.
At the other extreme, full publicness brings out the natural differences in group pref-
erences over public goods. Now fractionalization plays no role. Only the measures re-
flecting inter-group alienation remain: the Gini and the polarization index. The relative
weighting that each enjoys now depends on the degree of group cohesion or identifi-
cation. When α = 0, there is no group identification at all and only the Gini coefficient
matters. When α = 1 it is polarization that comes to the forefront.
What is remarkable about this result, though, is that precisely these three measures —
and only these three — are highlighted by our model of conflict (and that they enter in
this convenient linear fashion). It is the simplicity of this relationship which is the main
contribution of the paper.
At the same time, this extremely simple structure depends on the approximation that
all behavioral correction factors equal unity. Our first task below is to provide a formal
proof of the Proposition that shows exactly where the approximation lies. Our second
task is to judge the accuracy of the approximation by computing the exact solution
10
for conflict (without the restriction on correction factors) and compare this with the
approximate solution described in Proposition 2. We shall do this numerically.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall the equilibrium condition (13), which we write as
m∑
j=1
pipj
σi∆ij
niN
= rθi =
pθi ρ
θ
nθi
,
where ρ ≡ R/N . Multiply both sides by p1−θi nθi and use the fact that pi = γini to obtain
piρ
θ =
m∑
j=1
p2−θi pjn
θ−1
i
σi∆ij
N
=
m∑
j=1
γ2−θi γjninj
σi∆ij
N
.
Adding over all i we conclude that
(15) ρθ =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
γ2−θi γjninj
σi∆ij
N
.
Recall that σi = (1−α) +αNi, that ∆ii = 0, and that ∆ij = λδij + (1−λ)/ni for all i 6= j,
where δij is defined in the statement of the proposition. Opening up the terms σi and
∆ij , and setting all correction factors to their approximation of 1, we see that
ρθ ≈
m∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
ninj
[
1− α
N
+ αni
] [
λδij +
1− λ
ni
]
.
Expanding these terms, we obtain the desired result.
5. ACCURACY OF THE APPROXIMATION
The use of approximations is standard in economics. For instance, we use GNP as a
proxy of social welfare or the Gini index of the distribution of personal income as a
proxy for the level of equality. In both cases these measures abstract from the effects of
endogenous individual choices, such as labor effort or consumption decisions (among
other things). Yet, we find them useful indicators for the complex variables they intend
to capture. Hoping for a good approximation by sacrificing the behavioral correction
factors is exactly in the same spirit.
At the same time, the explicit nature of the model means that the accuracy of this ap-
proximation can be examined, and our exercise would be seriously incomplete if we
did not do so. It appears to be difficult to do so analytically, though we do not rule out
the possibility.
Before we proceed to a more detailed discussion, we should note that there are ques-
tions for which the discrepancy between pi and ni (or the divergence of the behavioral
11
correction factor from unity) is of first order interest. For example, Esteban and Ray
(1999) study the “activism” of “extremist” groups (those that are positioned at one end
of a line in preference space), defining activism precisely by the ratio of pi to ni. Or con-
sider the well-known Pareto-Olson thesis, which argues that small groups have a higher
ratio of pi to ni. These are important issues in their own right, but all the same it is legit-
imate to ask whether neglecting them can significantly alter the structural relationship
asserted in Proposition 2.
5.1. Variation in the Correction Factors. While a fully analytical approach appears to
be out of reach, some preliminary remarks may be useful. Recall (15), which we use as
the basis for our approximation result. We have
ρθ =
m∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
γ2−θi γjninj
[
1− α
N
+ αni
] [
λδij +
1− λ
ni
]
≈ α
m∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
γ2−θi γj
[
λn2injδij + (1− λ)ninj
]
,(16)
where the second approximate equality takes the limit as N becomes large. A quick
consultation of the equilibrium condition (13) tells us, moreover, that ri becomes insen-
sitive to the exact value of α as N grows large, keeping population proportions in each
group constant.18 This means that the same is true of the correction factors γi, and we
can conclude that for large populations, ρθ is roughly proportional to α.
Meanwhile, the same is true of our approximation, which states that
ρθ ≈ α[λP + (1− λF )]
for large N . It follows that the relative accuracy of our approximation is independent of
α when the population is large (as long as α is positive). This is why in the simulations
below we shall fix α at one positive value (0.5) in the case of large populations. The
specific value of α may well matter, however, when population is “small”.
More significantly, the accuracy of our approximation may depend on the mix of pub-
lic and private goods (the value of λ). To see this a bit more explicitly, focus on the
case of contests and quadratic cost functions. Recall the first order condition (12) and
manipulate it slightly to write
riρ =
[
1− α
N
+ αni
]
∆i(1− pi),
where ∆i ≡ λ+(1−λ)/ni. Now sendN to infinity and manipulate some more to obtain
(17) pi =
αn2i∆i
ρ2 + αn2i∆i
18To see this, observe that σi/Ni converges to 1 as Ni → ∞, and that α appears nowhere else in the
system described by (13).
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for all i, where ρ2 must solve
m∑
j=1
αn2j∆j
ρ2 + αn2j∆j
= 1.
This last equation confirms that ρ2 is linearly homogeneous in α; i.e., that ρ2 = αρˆ2,
where ρˆ is equilibrium per-capita conflict when α = 1. Substituting this into (17) and
dividing through by ni, we obtain an expression for the correction factors:
(18) γi =
ni∆i
ρˆ2 + n2i∆i
for all i, where ρˆ2 must solve
m∑
j=1
n2j∆j
ρˆ2 + n2j∆j
= 1.
If we look at the case of purely private goods, we have λ = 0, so that (18) reduces to
γi =
1
ρˆ2 + ni
.
Now smaller groups will have the higher value of γ (this is precisely the Pareto-Olson
thesis). This means that terms with a low value of ni and nj in (16) will receive greater
prominence than in the approximation, or equivalently, than in the fractionalization
index. With purely public goods, we have λ = 1, and (18) reduces to
γi =
ni
ρˆ2 + n2i
.
While a comparison with pure public goods is not immediate (in particular, the two
values of ρˆ are not the same), there is less variation in γ across group sizes and the
relationship between ni and γi will generally be ambiguous.
How important are these deviations from the approximate specification in Proposition
2? Not very, as we shall now see.
5.2. Numerical Analysis. We now examine the accuracy of our approximation by means
of numerical analysis. To this end we run a series of simulations based on random
draws for the parameter values describing group sizes and preferences. For each these
randomly drawn societies we compute the exact level of conflict and compare it to our
linear approximation. There are several cases that we consider.
5.2.1. A Baseline Case. Our baseline exercise is the case of contests with quadratic costs.
First consider large populations. Then, by the discussion in the previous section we may
take α = 0.5 without any loss of generality. We examine several degrees of publicness
in the payoffs: λ = 0, 0.2, 0.8 and 1.0 (we report on λ = 0.5 in a later variation). In each
of these cases, we take numerous random draws of a population distribution over five
groups.
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FIGURE 1. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: BASELINE CASE
Figure 1 depicts the scatter plot of the approximate and true values of ρθ (ρ2, in this case).
In each situation (and in all successive figures as well), we plot the true value of conflict
on the horizontal axis and the approximation on the vertical axis. We also use the same
units for both values, so that the diagonal, shown in every figure, is interpretable as
equality in the two values. The top two panels perform simulations when private goods
are dominant (λ = 0.0, 0.2) and the bottom panels do the same when public goods are
dominant (λ = 0.8, 1.0).
Remarkably, we obtain a very strong correlation between true and approximate values
for equilibrium conflict suggesting that the “behavior correction factors” do not play a
critical role in explaining conflict.
Notice how we underapproximate the true value of conflict when λ is close to zero,
and the overall conflict is small. This is related to the Pareto-Olson argument discussed
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in the previous section. Low conflict will occur in non-polarized societies with one or
more small groups. When the conflict is over private goods (which is the case with λ
small), small groups will put in more resources per-capita. Because our approximation
ignores this effect, it underestimates conflict, especially when the value of that conflict
is relatively small. In a similar vein, we tend to overestimate conflict (for small val-
ues of conflict) when λ is close to 1. With public goods at stake, small groups put in
less resources compared to their population share, and true conflict is smaller than the
approximation predicts.
 
FIGURE 2. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: VARYING UTILITY DISTANCES
That said, the correlation between the two variables is unaffected and the relationship
appears broadly linear. What is remarkable is how close the approximation really is,
and yet how difficult it appears to be to get a handle on this analytically. That there is
no simple relationship between the two values is evident from the highly nontrivial (yet
concentrated) scatter generated by the model.
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However, note that in all situations, symmetric or near-symmetric population distribu-
tions over all groups with positive populations will have the property that correction
factors are unimportant. This is why there are regions in every panel where the simula-
tions take us precisely to the diagonal.
This high correlation is retained in all the reasonable variations that we have studied.
Some examples follow.
5.2.2. Inter-Group Distances. The next set of simulations studies varying inter-group dis-
tances, instead of pure contests. Recall that distances are to be interpreted as losses from
having the other public goods in place, instead of the group’s favorite. We modify the
previous simulation and now permit utility losses to vary across groups pairs (retaining
the symmetry restriction that uij = uji). This is done by taking numerous independent
draws of the matrix describing pairwise utility losses. We retain the baseline specifica-
tion in all other ways. The results are reported in Figure 2, for various values of λ. As in
the baseline case, the top panels perform simulations with private goods (λ = 0.0, 0.2)
and the bottom panels do the same for public goods (λ = 0.8, 1.0). The correlations con-
tinue to be remarkably high and the general features of the baseline case are retained.
5.2.3. Small Populations. We return to the case of contests (with quadratic cost functions)
and now study “small” populations. We suppose that there are 50 individuals in the
economy, and consider numerous allocations of this population to the five groups. We
report results for one case in which private goods are dominant (λ = 0.2) and another
in which public goods are dominant (λ = 0.8). Notice that with small populations, the
value of group cohesion α will generally matter. The top panel of Figure 3 reports our
results for private goods under two values of α, 0.5 and 1.0. The bottom panel does the
same for public goods. The correlations continue to be very high and the other features
discussed for the baseline case are retained.
5.2.4. Other Cost Elasticities. Finally, we explore a set of variations in which we change
the cost function from quadratic to other isoelastic specifications. We report four sets of
results in Figure 4, all for the case with λ = 0.5 and large populations. One is for the
baseline quadratic case. The remaining three are for progressively higher elasticities of
the cost function: θ = 3, 4 and 10.
Once again, the large correlations that we obtain remain undisturbed. Indeed, the sim-
ulations suggest that as the elasticity of the cost function goes up, our approximation
improves even further. This is intuitive, as a highly curved cost function will lead to
greater uniformity in the per-capita contribution of resources, thereby bringing the be-
havioral correction factors closer to unity.
It is certainly possible to try various combinations of these variations. We have done so,
but do not report these results for the sake of brevity. In all the specifications we have
tried, the approximation theorem we use appears to be more than satisfactory.
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FIGURE 3. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: SMALL POPULATION
6. SUMMARY
We have set up a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for the use of F,G
and/or P as indicators for conflict.
[A] We have shown that the equilibrium level of resources expended in conflict can be
approximated by a linear combination of the three indices, using the degree of altruism
and of publicness as weights.
[B] The higher is the altruism the more pertinent fractionalization and polarization are
in explaining conflict. The higher the degree of publicness the pertinent indices are
inequality and polarization.
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FIGURE 4. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: NONQUADRATIC COSTS
[C] In simulations we find a very high correlation between our approximation and the
true value of per capita conflict. This suggests that the behavior correction factors do
not play a critical role.
Most importantly, this paper suggests new key features in explaining conflict: the de-
gree of publicness in the payoff and the level of group mindedness in individual behav-
ior. It seems plausible that the two dimensions are not independent of each other. One
would expect high individualism in conflicts with a purely private payoff and higher
group motivation when the payoff sought is essentially public in nature. The connection
between these two dimensions is a matter of future research.
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APPENDIX
Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2003) axiomatize the following class of
polarization measures. Let population be distributed on [0,∞) with density f(x). The class is
given by
Pβ = K
∫ ∫
f(x)1+βf(y)|x− y|dxdy, for some constant K > 0 and β ∈ [0.25, 1].
Axiom 5. Suppose that a distribution consists of three equi-spaced uniform basic densities of
sizes r, p and q, as shown in Figure 5, each of support 2. Assume that p = q + r. Then there is
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η > 0 such that if 0 < r < η and 0 <  < η, any uniform transfer of population mass from r to q
cannot decrease polarization.
r p q
0 a 2a
2! 2! 2!
FIGURE 5. Figure for Axiom 5.
Intuitively, this axiom asserts that if the group of size r is extremely small, it cannot be contribut-
ing much on its own to social tension. If instead the population is transferred from that group
to another group which is “equally opposed” to the largest group of size p (and of mass slightly
smaller than p), then polarization cannot come down.
THEOREM 1. Under the additional Axiom 5, it must be that β = 1, so the unique polarization measure
that satisfies the five axioms is proportional to∫ ∫
f(x)2f(y)|y − x|dydx.
Proof. Consider a distribution generated from three copies of a uniform basic density as in Ax-
iom 5, exactly as shown in Figure 5. The bases are centered at locations 0, a and 2a. Each has
width 2. The heights are r, p and q.
First we show necessity. Suppose that the axiom is true. Take parameters z ≡ (p, q, r, ) to satisfy
the conditions of the axiom, and transfer a small amount δ uniformly from the r-mass to the q-
mass. Then polarization (viewed as a function of δ and the other parameters z) is given by the
three “internal” polarizations of each basic density as well as the pairwise effective antagonisms
across each pair of basic densities, which makes for nine terms in all:
P (δ, z) = I()
[
(r − δ)2+β + p2+β + (q + δ)2+β]+ C2() [(r − δ)1+β(q + δ) + (q + δ)1+β(r − δ)]
+C()
[
(r − δ)1+βp+ p1+β(q + δ) + (q + δ)1+βp+ p1+β(r − δ)] ,
where I() is the “total internal distance” within each rectangle:
I() ≡
∫ 
−
∫ 
−
|x− y|dxdy = 8
3
3
,
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C() is the “total distance” across neighboring rectangles:
C() ≡
∫ 
−
∫ a+
a−
(x− y)dxdy = 4a2,
and C2() is the “total distance” between the side rectangles:
C2() ≡
∫ 
−
∫ 2a+
2a−
(x− y)dxdy = 8a2.
Differentiating P (δ, z) with respect to δ (write this partial derivative as P ′(δ, z)) and evaluating
the result at δ = 0, we see that
P ′(0, z) = (2 + β)I()
[
q1+β − r1+β]+ (1 + β)C() [qβp− rβp]
− C2() [q1+β − r1+β + (1 + β)(rβq − qβr)] .
Substituting the values for I(), C() and C2(), we see that
1
4
−2P ′(0, z) = (2 + β)
2
3
[
q1+β − r1+β]+ (1 + β)ap [qβ − rβ]
− 2a [q1+β − r1+β + (1 + β)(rβq − qβr)] .(19)
The axiom insists that P ′(0, z) must be nonnegative for all values of z such that p = q + r and
r sufficiently small. Fixing p and a, take a sequence of z’s such that r → 0, q → p and  → 0.
Noting that P ′(0, z) ≥ 0 throughout this sequence, we can pass to the limit in (19) to conclude
that
(1 + β)− 2 ≥ 0,
which, given that β ≤ 1, proves that β = 1.
To establish the converse, put β = 1 and consider (19) again. We see that for any configuration
with q > r,
1
4
−2P ′(0, z) = 2
[
q2 − r2]+ 2ap [q − r]− 2a [q2 − r2]
> 2ap [q − r]− 2a(q − r)(q + r)
= 2ap [q − r]− 2ap [q − r] = 0,
where the penultimate equality uses the restriction that p = q + r.
